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Ukraine’s Yushchenko Under Siege 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
On 30 January, Ukraine President Viktor Yushchenko suffered a major blow 
when he was forced to accept the resignation of his pro-western Foreign Minister 
and longtime ally Borys Tarsyuk. (1) The resignation is the latest salvo in a 
political struggle that has left Yushchenko isolated and under a continuous 
barrage not only from Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, but also from his former 
ally and former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. In the process, Yushchenko, 
largely through his own actions, has lost most of the authority he won during the 
Orange Revolution.  
 
The political struggle also has caused confusion in foreign capitals; it is unclear 
who is directing foreign policy, it is unclear who speaks for Ukraine 
internationally, and it is unclear if either the president or the prime minister has 
the ability to follow through on promises made to potential international allies.  
 
The Tarasyuk saga 
Borys Tarasyuk had been in the middle of a tug of war between the president 
and prime the minister for almost two months. On 1 December, at Prime Minister 
Yanukovych’s request, parliament voted to dismiss Tarasyuk, who had been 
appointed by Yushchenko. The president strenuously objected to the move and 
maintains that the vote was invalid. (2) This dispute between the president and 
prime minister centered on Tarasyuk’s unfailing pro-western orientation and his 
determination to pursue European Union and NATO membership for his country. 
Yanukovych has rhetorically supported Ukraine’s pro-Western orientation, but 
rejects NATO membership and has stopped all concrete movement toward the 
EU.  
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Until his resignation, Tarasyuk continued to represent Ukraine on foreign trips at 
Yushchenko’s behest, while at the same time being barred by government 
security from entering his office or participating in cabinet meetings. (3) However, 
possibly in reaction to a decision by a Ukrainian district court to call Yushchenko 
to testify during Tarasyuk’s appeal, the president backed down. The retreat likely 
signals a major foreign policy shift, with only one Yushchenko ally remaining in 
the government – Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko. Although the constitution 
allows Yushchenko to appoint a new foreign minister, the parliament must 
approve the nomination.  
 
Law on cabinet shifts powers to Yanukovych 
The domestic situation in Ukraine became significantly more confusing on 12 
January, when parliament extended its attack to include not only Yushchenko’s 
foreign minister, but also Yushchenko’s most basic influence on the government. 
The chamber voted to override Yushchenko’s veto of a bill that drastically 
reduces his power. (4) In particular, the Law on the Cabinet of Ministers allows 
the parliament to appoint the prime minister without presidential approval, taking 
away Yushchenko’s ability to influence the formation of the cabinet. The bill also 
grants the prime minister the authority to appoint and dismiss the foreign and 
defense ministers, removing this prerogative from Yushchenko’s purview. This 
latter provision directly contradicts the country’s constitution and likely would be 
overturned in any constitutional legal challenge. 
 
Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine political bloc is challenging the legality of the Law on 
the Cabinet override, based on what the party says are differences in the wording 
of the bill originally vetoed by the president and the bill sent to the president after 
the override vote. The president received new wording of the bill, his press 
service said, and therefore, parliament’s vote cannot be considered an override. 
(5) On 22 January, following an Our Ukraine complaint, the Mukacheva District 
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Court agreed with the president and issued an injunction against implementation 
of the law, pending further review. (6)  
 
Prime Minister Yanukovych and his ally, Parliamentary Speaker Oleksandr 
Moroz, deny that the wording of the bill was changed and have vowed to 
implement the law, despite the court order. On 30 January, Moroz published 
“information about the official publication” of the law in the government and 
parliament newspapers, but has refrained from publishing the text. (7) One day 
earlier, he suggested that parliament may be ready to support the president's 
amendments to the law. (8) The president responded weakly by calling for a 
“roundtable” to search for “compromise.” (9) Given the lack of success at past 
presidential roundtables, and his retreat over Tarasyuk, it is doubtful that such a 
move would do much to ease Yushchenko’s plight. It is clear, however, that 
Ukraine remains mired in a legal and political morass. 
 
Tymoshenko sends Yushchenko a message 
The override removing many of Yushchenko’s powers succeeded only because 
his former Orange Revolution ally Yulia Tymoshenko chose to support the 
measure. With this vote, it became apparent that the president no longer can 
expect the unilateral support of her bloc on any piece of legislation – even a 
measure on which they were united previously. The vote against the president 
seemed unexpected to members of Our Ukraine, who marched out of the 
parliamentary chamber in protest. (10) Yushchenko can now count on the 
support of only 80 out of 450 deputies for his proposals – on a good day.  
 
The move by Tymoshenko prompted cries of “betrayal” from Our Ukraine, and 
suggestions that Tymoshenko and the 125 members of her parliamentary bloc 
had turned away from the “orange ideals.” (11) 
 
The vote also shocked many of those who had stood in Ukraine’s Independence 
Square, watching their two leaders arm in arm, during what would become 
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known as the Orange Revolution. Although the two have endured strained 
relations throughout most of their political careers, a vote by Tymoshenko to 
remove significant powers from Yushchenko and turn them over to revolution 
opponent Yanukovych seemed unimaginable. This is particularly true since, in 
2004, Tymoshenko fought vehemently against constitutional reforms that granted 
the prime minister’s office greater powers – reforms which Yushchenko ironically 
supported.  
 
But much has changed in Ukraine. Since the Orange Revolution, Yushchenko 
has seen a significant diminution in public support, while both Yanukovych and 
Tymoshenko have seen their popularity ratings surpass the president’s.  
 
Some history 
Instead of moving quickly to consolidate his power directly after taking office, 
Viktor Yushchenko chose to separate himself from his closest allies, while 
reaching out to his former opponents. In the process, he alienated his revolution 
partner Tymoshenko and allowed Yanukovych gradually to undermine his 
power.  
 
Despite the current suggestion from Our Ukraine that Tymoshenko has betrayed 
them with this latest vote, the first break in the “Orange” team, as Yushchenko 
and Tymoshenko became known during the revolution, actually occurred when 
Yushchenko dismissed Tymoshenko from the post of prime minister in 
September 2005. The dismissal came during a purge of several Yushchenko 
allies who had been accused of corrupt or inappropriate activities (none were 
ever proven) in their positions.  
 
Neither Tymoshenko nor anyone in her cabinet was mentioned in these 
allegations, but the prime minister had used her position successfully to increase 
her popularity and had bumped heads with Yushchenko's aides on a number of 
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issues. When the president dismissed his tarnished aides, in one broad sweep, 
he dismissed Tymoshenko and her allies, too. (12) 
 
Shortly thereafter, Yushchenko signed a Memorandum of Understanding with 
Viktor Yanukovych, resuscitating the political career of his former presidential 
and revolution opponent. In return, Yanukovych agreed to vote to confirm 
Yushchenko’s new choice for prime minister. (13) The president was criticized 
heavily for the agreement, which included support of an amnesty for electoral 
fraud and the introduction of immunity from prosecution for local deputies. (14) 
 
The voters took their first revenge during the March 2006 parliamentary 
elections, as Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc (14%) was beaten soundly by The 
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYUT) (23%). Yanukovych, meanwhile, placed first with 
32%. But instead of actively supporting a reuniting of the “orange coalition,” 
which would have controlled a parliamentary majority, Yushchenko introduced 
Yanukovych’s name into parliament for confirmation as prime minister. Our 
Ukraine joined an ill-fated coalition government with Yanukovych, and 
Tymoshenko announced her “radical opposition” to the government.  
 
Reading the tea leaves 
Given the history of the two since the Orange Revolution, it is no surprise that 
Tymoshenko’s reflex reaction to support Yushchenko was not in top form. 
Nevertheless, the vote by Tymoshenko is more than a bit perplexing. As longtime 
Ukraine analyst Taras Kuzio wrote in his recent BBC blog, “Those of us who 
have been following Soviet and post-Soviet developments have become used to 
reading between the lines and figuring out what is really going on behind the 
scenes. This ability is now seriously stretched.” (15) Surely, there must be more 
of a reason for the vote than irritation over Yushchenko’s past treatment of his 
former ally.  
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Tymoshenko quickly suggested that this vote "absolutely did not" represent any 
alliance with Yanukovych and named several reasons for the action. First, in 
return for assisting in the override of the President’s veto, the ruling coalition 
supported, in the first reading, the Law on the Opposition. This bill, which 
guarantees the political opposition a number of important rights, could be a major 
step forward in Ukrainian politics. If passed into law in the second reading, it 
would place Ukraine securely in the realm of Western European, pluralistic, 
parliamentary republics. Tymoshenko said, “What you have seen is an interim 
position in order to secure gains for Ukraine’s long-term future.” (16) But even 
Tymoshenko admitted that passage of the Law on Opposition in the second 
reading is not guaranteed.  
 
BYUT's Law on Imperative Mandate for local councils also was passed in the 
second reading. The law will make it virtually impossible for a local deputy 
elected on a party list to oppose the wishes of the party leadership, for fear of 
being expelled. This could be a major improvement, eliminating the potential for 
bribery, extortion and coercion of individual deputies. This will only be the case, 
however, if the provision to expel members is not abused by party leadership.  
 
Tymoshenko also suggested that the vote would “end the constitutional crisis” 
between the president and the prime minister by placing power securely in the 
hands of one, and that this vote is meant to set the stage for a dismissal of 
parliament by the president. (17) In fact, at a meeting congress of 3,000 BYUT 
local deputies, Tymoshenko announced that she already had begun creating a 
new election list for a new election. (18) 
 
It seems unlikely that this vote by BYUT will end the constitutional crisis, since 
constitutional challenges are likely to ensue if the law comes into force as 
passed. Moreover, it seems even less likely that Yushchenko will embrace 
Tymoshenko’s idea to dismiss parliament, which would necessitate working with 
Tymoshenko during and following any new parliamentary election. In the past, 
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Yushchenko has demonstrated an almost pathological aversion to working with 
Tymoshenko, even to his own detriment and to the detriment of his 
programs. This likely will increase after the latest vote. 
 
It may be possible that Tymoshenko doesn’t have any real expectation that the 
president will dismiss parliament, especially given the lack of any legal reason to 
do so. Instead, with the vote, Tymoshenko forces Yushchenko into a choice—
enter into further agreements and compromises with Yanukovych or begin 
working in a collaborative manner again with her to push forward his agenda.  
 
The situation resembles that of September 2005, when Tymoshenko refused to 
support Yushchenko’s choice to replace her as prime minister. The president 
then chose to sign the soon-to-be-broken Memorandum of Understanding with 
Yanukovych. This move drastically undermined voter support for him and his 
party, and would not have been necessary had Tymoshenko supported him. 
Tymoshenko used that memorandum effectively in her parliamentary election 
campaign. 
 
To this end, BYUT deputy head and foreign policy advisor Hryhoriy Nemyria 
suggests that Tymoshenko was attempting to block any possible new 
agreements between Yushchenko and Yanukovych, thus clarifying once again 
the choice facing the president. (19) 
 
Regardless, in Internet chat rooms and on the streets of Kyiv, voters now are 
expressing not only irritation with Yushchenko, but also with Tymoshenko, for 
voting “with” the man she has always fought, and against the man she has 
always supported. She, no doubt, is trusting that her oratory and political skills, 
which have served her in good stead in the past, will help her explain her position 
and calm the criticism of this vote. Should Tymoshenko quickly return to “radical” 
opposition tactics, voters may overlook this “situational” alliance with 
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Yanukovych—as they did after the September 2005 prime minister vote. But 
there is no doubt that the strategy is a risky one. 
 
The next steps of both Tymoshenko and Yushchenko will determine what effect 
this vote may or may not have on their popularity and on the future direction of 
the country. While nothing is certain in Ukraine, given the President’s past 
inability to outmaneuver opponents politically, prospects for his political career 
seem bleak. And prospects for Ukraine’s Western orientation also seem dim in 
the near future. 
 
“Frankly speaking, we do not understand who represents Ukraine,” said Poland’s 
Ambassador to Ukraine Jazec Klyuchkovsk recently. (20) Latvian President Vaira 
Vike-Freiberga was even more blunt during the Davos World Economic Forum 
on 26 January. "The Ukrainian people deserve much better than what they have,” 
she said. (21) 
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